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VIRTUAL WORLDS AS COMPARATIVE LAW
JAMES GRIMMELMANN*
I. INTRODUCTION
One way of talking about virtual worlds1 and law is to talk
about the laws that might be applied to such worlds.  This was the
approach taken by many presenters at the State of Play confer-
ence.2  In various combinations, they discussed possible sources of
legal control over virtual world game spaces and reasons to support
or oppose such legal control.
I intend to do something different.  For purposes of this Arti-
cle, I would like to take seriously the claims of virtual world games
to be genuinely new societies, at least for awhile.  Societies have
laws, so why should virtual societies be any different?  My topic,
then, will not be the law of virtual worlds, but rather law in virtual
worlds.  If lawyers can learn from studying the legal systems of com-
mon law and civil law countries,3 perhaps we can also learn from
studying the legal systems of virtual law worlds.
In some cases, these legal systems track our own surprisingly
well.  In other cases, the contrasts are striking.  Both the similarities
* J.D. candidate, Yale Law School, 2005.  The author would like to thank Amy
Chua, Jack Balkin, Beth Noveck, the attendees at the State of Play conference, and
those who provided comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1. Following Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds,
92 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2004).  I will use the term “virtual worlds” to describe these spaces.
Like them, I am mostly concerned with large multiplayer online games, and will some-
times refer simply to “games” when the meaning is clear from context.
2. See, e.g., Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 185
(2004); Julian Dibbell, Owned!  Intellectual Property in the Age of Dupers, Gold Farmers,
eBayers, and Other Enemies of the Virtual State, at http://www.nyls.edu/docs/dibbell.pdf
(last visited June 23, 2004); Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Gilded Cage: User-Created Content
and Building the Metaverse, 49 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 81 (2004); Susan Crawford, Who’s in
Charge of Who I Am?: Identity and Law Online, 49 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 211 (2004).  Jack
Balkin, Rebecca Tushnet, and Yochai Benkler also gave presentations discussing how
real-world law might or might not adapt to handle games.
3. See RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 2 (David L. Shapiro et al.
eds., 1998) (“By the use of the method of comparison, it becomes possible to make
observations and to gain insights that would be denied to one whose study is limited to
the law of a single country.”).
147
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and differences between real-life law and virtual law are instructive.
They can teach us something about what is really going on in virtual
worlds, and they can teach us something about what is really going
on in our own world.
This Article is therefore a thought experiment; an attempt to
lay the necessary conceptual foundations for talking coherently
about “in-game” law.  I will identify four recurring problems in vir-
tual worlds, and discuss what we might gain by thinking about these
problems as legal ones.
Part II of this Article will discuss virtual property, which has
been one of the most spectacularly successful features of massively
multiplayer games.  Studying the mechanics and meaning of “own-
ership” within games has the potential to tell us a great deal about
the mechanics and meaning of law in virtual worlds more generally.
Part III will discuss the forms of investment and exchange gov-
erned by contract law in the real world.  Virtual economies seem to
be humming along without extensive bodies of contract law.  Ex-
plaining this absence provides us a useful framework for thinking
about wealth and society and how these concepts do or do not
change as they go online.
Part IV explores the social dynamics of groups of players, spe-
cifically, how they prevent undesired conduct by others and how
they band together for common purposes.  Here, the challenge is
to find good analogies to similar problems of real-life law.
Finally, Part V turns to one of the most discussed problems in
game design: How do we reassure players that designers’ over-
whelming powers over game spaces will not be used maliciously?  If
we look at the corresponding problem from real-life law — how to
restrain seemingly unrestrainable sovereign powers — we see that
law has a good deal to say about the practical techniques by which a
lasting and trusting relationship between seeming unequals can be
established.
II. VIRTUAL PROPERTY
If one had to choose a single canonical feature of multiplayer
online games, there would be no contest.  Property is invariably
among the first features implemented in any game; only the abili-
ties to communicate with other players and to move around the
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game world are as widespread.4  Even though it would be techni-
cally just as easy to make all virtual items pure public goods, no
game has ever gone this route.
Further, virtual property has been an enormous success in two
related ways.  First, these propertized spaces have been commercial
successes as games because people enjoy fiddling with virtual prop-
erty enough to play games that feature it.5  Second, this virtual
property has been a success as property.  A Chinese court has con-
sidered such property real enough to order its restitution6 and play-
ers in general consider it reliable enough to sustain a large and
lucrative trade in virtual items.7
Dan Hunter and Greg Lastowka make a strong case that virtual
property replicates many of the incidents of real world property
and satisfies the normative demands made by the major theories
justifying property.8  Their argument, in essence, is that the fact
that this new virtual property is created and protected by computer
code does not disqualify it from being property.  They are princi-
pally concerned with the demands made on property by real-life
law.
We might also ask, however, how this new form of property
functions within the “legal” context of the virtual worlds that define
it.  A common perspective is that property law mediates between
the natural world of things and the made world of human social
practice.  Typical of this perspective is the law and economics ac-
4. See, e.g., EverQuest Manual, at http://eqlive.station.sony.com/manual/ (last
visited May 30, 2004); see also EverQuest Manual Chapter 3: Quick Start, at http://eqlive.
station.sony.com/manual/manual.jsp?chapter=3 (last visited May 30, 2004) (explain-
ing, in order, how to move, communicate, attack, use magic, and pick up items); Ultima
Online Playguide, at http://guide.uo.com/index.shtml (last visited May 30, 2004); see
Starting Up, at http://guide.uo.com/start3d_0.html (last visited May 30, 2004) (explain-
ing installation, moving, communicating, and picking up items); Dark Age  of Camelot
Manual, at http://support.darkageofcamelot.com/ (last visited May 30, 2004).
5. See, e.g., The Themis Report on Online Gaming 2004, at http://www.themis-group.
com/view_news.phtml?id=24 (Jan. 6, 2004) (predicting more than $1.1 billion in reve-
nue from virtual worlds in 2004); Bruce Sterling Woodcock, An Analysis of MMOG Sub-
scription Growth, at http://pw1.netcom.com/~sirbruce/Subscriptions.html (last visited
May 30, 2004).
6. Online Gamer in China Wins Virtual Theft Suit, REUTERS, Dec. 20, 2003, available
at http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/fun.games/12/19/china.gamer.reut/.
7. See Edward Castronova, On Virtual Economies, GAME STUDIES vol. 3, no. 2 (Dec.
2003), available at http://www.gamestudies.org/0302/castronova/.
8. Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 1, at 56-66.
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count, which generally pushes for efficient rules.  Such rules allow
these two worlds to fit together with little disruption.9
Virtual world designers make some, but often quite limited, at-
tempts at optimizing their “laws” for efficiency.  The theory of prop-
erty law helps explain these attempts and their limits.  In the
process, it provides information both about virtual worlds and prop-
erty law.
A. Property and Computer Code
The basic theoretical problem for this caricature of law and
economics in virtual worlds is that there is no meaningful distinc-
tion between the natural world of things and rules of law.  Both are
equally and identically enforced by software.  What the software
does not allow is impossible.10  In this sense, there is seemingly no
mediation problem and the laws of the virtual world can be rewrit-
ten until they are optimally efficient.  Put another way, there is no
room for mediation because any “legal” mediation embodied in the
software immediately becomes part of the “natural” world.
As applied to virtual property, this equivalency means that
code-based property rights can be, and often are, absolute.  If I
“own” an enchanted sword, I am guaranteed to be the only player
who can use that sword.  No other player can use my virtual person-
alty, let alone take it from me.11  The game’s interface typically
9. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 36 (Richard A.
Epstein et al. eds., 1998) (“The proper incentives are created by parceling out mutually
exclusive rights to the use of particular resources among the members of society . . .
[I]ndividuals will endeavor by cultivation or other improvements to maximize the value
of land.  Land is just an example.  The principle applies to all valuable resources.”).
10. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 501, 531 (1999) (“Its [software’s] obligations instead flow automatically from
the structures imposed in the code.”). See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (2000) [hereinafter CODE AND OTHER LAWS].
11. This is not universally true among games.  Ultima Online has a “steal” feature
that lets thieves take random items from victims.  However, like all of Ultima Online’s
anti-social features, this feature does not work in certain safe areas (including cities),
requires physical proximity, is disabled entirely on some servers, and contributes to an
evil reputation. See noctalis.com: Ultima Online: Stealing, at http://noctalis.com/dis/uo/
o-stea1.shtml (last visited May 30, 2004); UO Stratics Reputation FAQ, at http://uo.strat-
ics.com/content/reputation/main.shtml (last visited May 30, 2004).  Sections within
the FAQ can be accessed through the links under “reputation” on the right sidebar.  In
particular, note the “thievery” section at http://uo.stratics.com/content/reputation/
thievery.shtml.  This feature is tightly confined and very precisely defined.
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won’t even have a command allowing another player to attempt to
use the sword; such a concept is inexpressible within the game’s
interface.
We might, however, more accurately describe the rights of
players in enchanted swords as “possessory,” rather than as “prop-
erty,” because they attach to the holder of an object for as long as
the item is carried.  As soon as it is set down on the ground, it be-
comes unowned and whoever picks it up next becomes the new
owner.12  Dropping constitutes abandonment.
Of course, this striking simplicity brings us to another thread
in the economic analysis of property law:  that much of the value of
property rights, even highly secure ones, comes from their granu-
larity.13  Unless they match the uses people wish to make of things,
many productive transactions will be foregone as too risky or impos-
sible to express.  There is a natural pressure on designers to provide
more detailed code-based property rules than the simple “posses-
sion-is-all rule.”
Getting these details right, however, is a startlingly complex af-
fair.  Take the example of virtual homeownership, a feature sup-
ported in many games.14  The most basic rule for virtual real estate
is to allow all players access to all areas at all times, a rule that ren-
ders ownership impossible and meaningless.15  The next most basic
rule allows only the owner of a virtual home to enter.16  However,
this rule is unhelpful to the owner who wants to have guests over for
a virtual party without giving them the keys to the door or the deed
to the house itself.  The virtual fee simple is too monolithic to be
useful.
12. See, e.g., Ultima Online Playguide, at http://guide.uo.com/start3d_9.html (last
visited Oct. 14, 2004) (“A dropped item will stay where it is until it deteriorates naturally
or someone picks it up”).
13. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 35-39 (2000) (discussing
both the importance of “frustration costs” resulting from insufficient granularity and
also countervailing factors).
14. See, e.g., Dark Age of Camelot Manual, at http://www.camelotherald.com/hous-
ing/manual/index.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
15. EverQuest, for example, does not support private ownership of real estate.
16. See, e.g., Dark Age of Camelot Manual, at http://www.camelotherald.com/hous-
ing/manual/chapter4.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2004) (defaulting to no access to home
by anyone other than owner).
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Thus, every major game that allows ownership of real estate
also gives owners the ability to choose who is allowed entry.17  In
property law terms, such games take the virtual fee simple and carve
out a new estate — let us call it the “right of visit.”  The right of visit
is perpetual, non-transferable, and subject to revocation by the
owner of the underlying fee simple.  Thanks to this right, owners
can use homes for parties.  The ability to pass out rights of visit
makes the underlying virtual fee simple more valuable.
While the right of visit solves one problem of coarse property
rights, it exposes another.  It is not a priori obvious how personal
property should interact with the right of visit.  At a virtual party,
you’d like guests to able to drink the refreshments but not walk off
with the silverware.  When designers implement a right of visit, they
consider whether there needs to be some way to drop an item, even
if only in one’s home, while retaining enough ownership to stop
anyone else from picking it up.18
This change, however, raises another issue. If a guest with a
right of visit enters a house and drops an item, does it remain
theirs, become the homeowner’s, or become a res nullius?  What if
the owner revokes the right of visit while a guest is in the home and
carrying items picked up inside?  What if the owner sells the house
with items and guests inside?  Some answers to these questions
seem better than others. For example, no game of which I am
aware follows the rule that items dropped inside a dwelling become
the property of the owner.  My point is that these questions inevita-
bly come up, no matter how complex the system of code-based
property rights may be.  And they can become quite complex.  For
example, Dark Age of Camelot defines ten separate estates: Visitor,
Guest, Resident, Tenant, Acquaintance, Associate, Friend, Ally, and
Partner, in addition to owner.  Further, each of these roles can be
customized with respect to a number of permissions, and home-
17. See, e.g., UO Stratics Homeowner’s Guide: Managing Your Household, at http://uo.
stratics.com/homes/betterhomes/hg_manage.shtml#security (last visited May 30,
2004) (discussing management of “access lists” that allow or prohibit entry to private
homes in Ultima Online).
18. See, e.g., Dark Age of Camelot Manual, at http://www.camelotherald.com/hous-
ing/manual/chapter5.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2004) (using “vaults” to protect particu-
lar items from guests allowed entry but not access to the contents of vaults inside).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-1\NLR108.txt unknown Seq: 7  8-DEC-04 12:08
2004] VIRTUAL WORLDS AS COMPARATIVE LAW 153
owners can use various kinds of special objects with their own spe-
cial rules.19
This form of radiating complexity is of course by no means
unique to software.  As intricate as these rules may be, they pale in
comparison to the Internal Revenue Code.20  The process of writ-
ing down exceptions and exceptions to exceptions can produce sys-
tems of breathtaking intricacy.  However, there is a crucial
difference between a highly-detailed system of legal rules and a
highly-detailed system of software rules; one rooted in the funda-
mental distinction between law and software.21  A law depends on
humans for its enforcement, which means that human cognitive bi-
ases will inevitably creep into the enforcement process as a law is
applied to particular cases.  Thus, as the complexity of a legal doc-
trine increases, so does its indeterminacy.  As the number of provi-
sions touching a given point of law increases, so to do the
opportunities to pick and choose, to shade one statutory interpreta-
tion or another.  The cumulative effect of many small ambiguities
can be enormous.  Complexity inherently begets ambiguity and cre-
ates space for creative lawyering and judicial discretion.
But in the world of software, increasing complexity does not
bring with it increased discretion.  This is so because software oper-
ates by itself: the only human in a position to determine its deci-
sions is its programmer.  Even as code-based property rights
become increasingly complex, with more exceptions and special
cases, they never become any less hard-nosed in their application.
The tests are always binary and objective.  One may need to sort
very carefully through the list of rules to determine which applies,
but, in principle, the outcome is always clear and free from doubt.22
Software, by its nature, does not have discretion in the same sense
that a judge does.  We can commit decisions to a computer, but we
cannot commit decisions to the reasoned discretion of the com-
puter.  In telling a computer which factors it should take into ac-
19. See Dark Age of Camelot Manual, supra note 16.
20. See Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S.
Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 272-74 (2002).
21. See generally CODE AND OTHER LAWS, supra note 10.
22. See DONALD E. KNUTH, THE ART OF COMPUTER PROGRAMMING 1-6 (3rd ed.
1997).
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count and how it should weight them, we pre-decide every possible
case.
Property law in virtual worlds is a helpful place to ground this
rather abstract jurisprudential point because property law in the
real world has been a fruitful place for grounding it.  The tension
between rules and standards in property law has a distinguished ac-
ademic history.23  The absence of one traditional hallmark of stan-
dards, post hoc discretion, is an invitation to rethink both the rule-
standard dichotomy and the nature of software-enforced “law” itself
in virtual worlds.
B. The Taking of Wild Monsters
On the other side of this mediation, specifically the relation-
ship between positive law and actual social practice, virtual worlds
again have the potential to serve as data points or as natural experi-
ments.  There is excellent evidence from a significant number of
games on how players (and player communities) shape their norms
around the software rules that are given to them, and on how these
norms then feed back into the decisions made by game designers.
We can incorporate evidence on actual practice from games into
discussions on law in the same way that we incorporate evidence on
actual practice among neighbors and competitors into such
discussions.
The capture of wild animals, even if not always of the greatest
practical importance, has a certain consistent attraction for scholars
and casebook editors.  Foxes24 and whales25 have become focal
points for theories about property, such as whether labor or posses-
sion is more important, which rule will maximize incentives for pro-
ductive investment, or which rule will avoid costly negotiations.26
Where property rights are being created, rather than merely trans-
23. E.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577
(1988).
24. E.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
25. E.g., Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881).
26. E.g., Richard Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979);
Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling
Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (1989); Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 72 (1985).
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ferred, the particular content of those rights and the rules by which
they are initially assigned are especially important.
Cases that are curiosities in the real world, however, are of cen-
tral importance in many online games.  In the large crop of quasi-
medieval games, with their strongly fantastic overtones, the capture
of wild animals is nothing less than the principal source of wealth.27
The single most profitable “industry” is hunting monsters and loot-
ing their corpses.  Unsurprisingly, the property rules governing ac-
quisition by capture are highly worked out, and yet essentially every
game that supplies code-based property to the killers of monsters
sees these code-based rules supplanted by understandings among
players.
For example, EverQuest automatically awards the experience
produced by killing a monster to that team of players which has
done the most damage to the monster.28  Therefore, at a code level,
EverQuest propertizes the experience to the people who have done
the majority of the work of the kill and turns the treasure into
unowned property which can be claimed by any finder.  Among the
EverQuest player community, however, this rule is not considered
normatively binding.  Instead, a group which is actively engaged in
fighting a monster, even if it has done little damage, is considered
to have a prospecting property right because attacking the monster
(unless the first group abandons the effort) is considered “kill steal-
ing” and is taboo.29  Sony considers kill stealers to be engaged in
27. See Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society
on the Cyberian Frontier, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=294828 (Dec. 2001); EverQuest Manual, supra note 4, at § 3.8 (“By far the best way to
gain that money is by defeating enemies.  In the areas just outside of the city that you
start in you will be able to find small creatures, often in plague proportions.  You can
aid your fellow citizens and earn cash in the process by defeating these pests and loot-
ing their corpses.”).
28. This rule is not officially stated by Sony, which keeps the details of its experi-
ence-granting algorithms secret.  It has, however, been reverse-engineered by players.
See, e.g., Jon “Jeh” MacLellan, Please?  Maybe a Thank You?, at http://www.gamespy.
com/editorials/april01/everquest/ (last visited June 21, 2004).
29. See, e.g., id (discussing “kill stealing”); Psalm of the Dragon Policies, at http://
www.psalmofthedragon.org/?view=policies (last visited June 4, 2004) (“No Ninja Loot-
ing, Kill Stealing, and Bottomfeeding”); Fellowship of Justice Guild Rules and Regulations, at
http://www.fellowshipofjustice.com/rules.php (last visited June 4, 2004) (“No kill steal-
ing will be tolerated by this guild.”).  A similar problem arises with respect to the tangi-
ble items and money a monster drops; “ninja looting” is a term of art equivalent to “kill
stealing” for such items.
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“griefing,” a term usually understood to mean deliberately annoy-
ing other players, and will suspend their accounts if it receives too
many complaints.30
Now, compare this rule to Asheron’s Call’s rules on kills.
There, experience is divided up in direct proportion to the amount
of damage a player does, so that if three players each independently
do equal damage, each receives a third of the experience.31  These
rules might have been written deliberately to fix EverQuest’s nor-
mative problem.  By allowing partial though not majority wounders
to keep experience in proportion to the damage they deal, these
rules create no danger of later hunters taking away the work that
earlier hunters have done.32  Yet despite this rule, Asheron’s Call
still has a kill stealing problem, in the sense that players feel the
need to define a code of conduct that forbids kill stealing and to
complain to the gamemaker when other players violate that code.33
Players get upset when other, more powerful, groups come in, like
bullies at the beach kicking sand in the faces of the weaklings and
stealing their beautiful monsters.  It seems that the kind of hot pur-
suit necessary to establish a normative right to the spoils is quite
weak.  One need not have immanent success, or even substantial
progress, or even, perhaps, a high likelihood of ultimate success.
Every game has a property rule on the spoils of killing mon-
sters embodied in its software.  Players, however, will deviate from
this rule based on their own social understandings.  The idea that
customary interactions will frequently depart from the law on point
is not a new one.  Robert Ellickson’s study of norms among neigh-
boring ranchers makes this point quite forcefully.34  His observa-
tion that people will often ignore an inappropriate or inefficient
legal rule has a special force in games, where the “law” is enforced
30. EverQuest Rules of Conduct 1.1.1, at http://eqlive.station.sony.com/support/
customer_service/cs_rules_of_conduct.jsp (last visited June 4, 2004).
31. Asheron’s Call Stratics — Frequently Asked Questions, at http://ac.stratics.com/
php-bin/faq/faq.php (last visited June 4, 2004).
32. See Ellickson, supra note 26, at 83.
33. See, e.g., Cairdeas AC2 Code of Conduct, at http://www.cairdeas.net/ac2/ac2coc.
aspx (last updated Feb. 4, 2003); Mu’s Asheron’s Call Rants, at http://mu.ranter.net/
asheron/acrants7.html (last visited June 4, 2004); Charter of the House of Colier, at http://
www.houseofcolier.org/index.php?content=charter (last visited June 4, 2004).
34. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DIS-
PUTES (1991).
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through software.  A judge might at least hope to sort through con-
flicting versions of a story, while software is necessarily blind to the
social meaning of events.
Consider again the case of the monster under attack by group
A when group B comes along and starts whaling on it.  Presumably,
this shift is an affront to group A’s hard work and wrongful as
against group A.  That is, unless group A made a commitment to
allow group B to go ahead and supplant it, or to split the loot.  But
what kind of commitment?  Perhaps this deal was negotiated using
the game’s chat mechanism.  This possibility alone removes this
case from the possibility of software adjudication.  Computerized
language processing is far too crude to parse text well enough to
understand that “We’ll go 50-50 on the plat with you if you help us
out, but we’ll keep anything else” is such a commitment.
Our knowledge of the meaning of these comments is deeply
embedded in our social competence.  We know the content of this
transaction because of our long experience being alive and engag-
ing in similar ones.  Trying to reduce such knowledge to computer-
intelligible form has been one of the many great failures of com-
puter science.35  Every law student knows why legal rules are so diffi-
cult to automate — a professor using the Socratic Method often
plays the part of the computer, acting dumb and taking the stu-
dent’s every word at literal face value.
C. Conclusion
The problem here is that, almost by definition, multiplayer
games are endowed by their players with a rich layer of social mean-
ing.  Players make friendships, tell jokes, and fill out their virtual
existences with their own ideas and interpretations.36  The game’s
code (and even often the game’s designers) is ignorant of it all.  If
every iota of this meaning were reduced to code, there would be no
35. See, e.g., Stuart M. Shieber, Lessons from a Restricted Turing Test, in COMM. ASS’N
FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, vol. 37, no. 6, 70-78 (1994) (“The AI problem, like the
problem of human-powered flight in the Renaissance, is only addressed directly and
dismissed as imminently solvable by those who underestimate its magnitude.”).
36. See JULIAN DIBBELL, MY TINY LIFE: CRIME AND PASSION IN A VIRTUAL WORLD
(1999). See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON
THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (MIT Press rev. ed. 2000) (1993) (commenting on the
human ability to create rich social meaning in online spaces).
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game.  The gaming conception of “possession-as-property” depends
fundamentally on players having a meaningful social understanding
of property.  Probing those social understandings is a large and
open topic for further study.
III. WEALTH, STATUS, AND CONTRACT
Reliable contract law — along with reliable property law —  is
the intuitive basis of a functional market economy.  If property gives
individuals economic security, then contract allows them to put
their property to use through productive exchange.37  But, while
online games have quite strong protections for property, they have
nothing that we would recognize as a comparable body of contracts
law.  Most games have no way to draft any contract more complex
than an immediate sale of goods for cash.38
This anomaly is even more striking in that most virtual worlds
possess a fully-functioning market economy, complete with
merchants, long distance trade, arbitrage, and recognizable
macroeconomic trends.39  We need an account of how these exten-
sive economies flourish without the promissory protections that we
think of as being central to contract law.40
A. Contract, Relation, and Status
This discussion naturally begins where the discussion of prop-
erty left off.  Everything noted above about the impossibility of en-
forcing through code all of players’ social understandings of
property rights applies with even more force to contracts.  The very
nature of contracting involves extensive attention to the particular
37. Historically, property and contractual rights were never far out of step with
each other. See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW (But-
terworth-Heinemann 1981) (1969).
38. Ultima Online’s concept of “vendor,” through which players can set prices at
which they will automatically sell items they own, is about the state of the art for in-
game contracting.  In legal terms, Ultima Online has reasonable support for option
contracts for the sale of goods. See Ultima Online Playguide, at http://guide.uo.com/
trade_4.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
39. Castronova, supra note 27.
40. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1982) (on the connection be-
tween promise and contract). But cf. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory
and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003) (excluding from the field of
“contract” all agreements between individuals).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-1\NLR108.txt unknown Seq: 13  8-DEC-04 12:08
2004] VIRTUAL WORLDS AS COMPARATIVE LAW 159
social understanding of the parties41 — precisely the sort of task to
which software is ill-suited.
Even representing contracts in a computer intelligible form is
a near intractable problem.  Enormous effort and expense have
been poured into automating contracts between businesses in the
real world, but even there, code is still at least five centuries behind
history.42  The most ambitious current proposals involve price ne-
gotiations for suppliers of goods and licensing regimes for con-
sumer media.  A quick tour through any contracts casebook reveals
how slight these ambitions are when compared with the wide vari-
ety of agreements represented therein.43
Expressing contracts is just one problem — enforcing them is
even more complex.  After all, in deciding a contractual dispute,
the decisionmaker is necessarily dealing with rules written by the
parties themselves and specific to the case at hand.  Determining
whether conduct constitutes compliance or breach requires under-
standing of the communicatory, contextual meanings of that con-
duct.  Such basic contractual issues as waiver,44 curing defects in
nonconforming goods,45 and assurance46 will not be capable of au-
tomatic enforcement until we have true artificial intelligence.
But this is hardly the end of the matter.  Property norms in
games are enforced by players and designers as well as through
code.  Kill-stealers are attacked, shunned, and even expelled from
games.  It seems at least plausible that oath-breakers could be simi-
41. For example, the doctrine of misunderstanding specifically inquires into
whether the parties’ subjective understandings of the contract are in accord, and will
void contracts if those understandings differ materially. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 20 (1981).
42. See, e.g., Simon Peyton Jones et al., Composing Contracts: An Adventure in Finan-
cial Engineering, 5 PROC. ACM SIGPLAN CONF. ON FUNCTIONAL PROGRAMMING 280 (2000)
(formalizing basic option contracts); Deirdre Mulligan et al., Supporting Limits on Copy-
right Exclusivity in a Rights Expression Language Standard, at http://www.law.berkeley.
edu/cenpro/samuelson/papers/other/OASIS_Submission_090602.pdf (Aug. 13,
2002) (noting the difficulty of embedding currently-common limitations on licensed
rights in computer-expressible form).
43. E.g., JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT (7th ed. 1998);
FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3rd ed. 1986).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 (1981).
45. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-508 (1998) [hereinafter U.C.C.].
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 (1981).
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larly disciplined.47  In fact, it is not so much that oath-breakers in
games roam freely48 as that very little ever reaches the stage of
oaths.  There is something about virtual worlds that does not mix
well with contracting.
We might plausibly ask how much practical difference rich
contractual protection would make.  The single most important
commercial transaction — the present sale of goods — can be han-
dled without formal contracts.49  Even in the complete absence of
trust, two characters can meet, open up a window to display their
offers, and then, when each has “inspected” the other’s goods, click
to confirm the trade and move on.50  The common contingencies
many contracts are drafted to avoid are simply not possibilities.  For
example, there is typically no danger of defective goods because
items in games typically don’t have hidden attributes.51  In fact,
many games, recognizing the centrality of cash sales of goods on
hand, have implemented special facilities for these common
transactions.52
If we think about the other kinds of transactions for which we
use contract law extensively in the real world, their underlying moti-
vations are often absent in game worlds.  There is comparatively
little practical use to contracts for sales at some later time because
47. ELLICKSON, supra note 34 (discussing the distinction among self-help, commu-
nity norm enforcement, and legal intervention).
48. Actually, there are some games where scammers seem to roam free, most nota-
bly The Sims Online. See TSO Fans, at http://www.tsofans.com (last visited June 25,
2004) (listing common scams to avoid).  No game seems totally immune to the prob-
lem, especially where new players are concerned. See also Stratics Central — Motor City
Online — Scam Avoidance, at http://www.stratics.com/content/portals/mco/content/
gameplay/bigben/scam.php (on file with the New York Law School Law Review); Ul-
tima Online Scam Prevention, at http://support.uo.com/scam.html (last visited June 6,
2004); The EverQuest Newbie Zone, at http://newbiezone.freewebspace.com/newbieFAQ.
html (last visited June 6, 2004).
49. For example, most provisions in Article 2 of the U.C.C. deal with nonperform-
ance, noncomplying goods, and ambiguous contractual terms — issues that are largely
irrelevant to present sales with the possibility of perfect inspection.
50. EverQuest Manual, supra note 4, at § 8.5.
51. See U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to 2-315.
52. EverQuest allows players to put items in their possession up for auction.  The
item is automatically sold to the highest bidder after a set time.  A variant, called the
“merchant bag,” lets players set a fixed price for immediate sale.  Ultima Online takes
this concept one step further.  Through “vendors,” players can in effect establish virtual
storefronts, selling goods at prices set by the player even when her character is else-
where in the game.
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game worlds are highly predictable.53  The harvests are reliable,
monsters appear in set locations and on set schedules, there are no
natural disasters, and no political turmoil ever threatens property
or closes off the main roads.54  There is also little practical use for
the large institutional contracts used in the real world to mobilize
capital and put it to productive use because games lack major in-
vestment opportunities of the sort that would require contractual
borrowing.55  There are no mines, factories, aqueducts, or other
capital intensive projects capable of paying for themselves.  Nor, for
that matter, do we see family-relations contracts.  Players frequently
“marry” each other in-game,56 but they almost never draw up pre-
marital agreements.57
This last example is suggestive.  To generalize it slightly, it
seems that games frequently have rules, either in code or in player
norms, governing status and adjustments to status.  The game al-
lows players to pick one profession or another,58 and players devise
extensive lists of qualifications as prerequisites for joining guilds.59
Yet games do not seem to exhibit a particularly rich contractual
penumbra around these incidents of status.  The dissatisfied spouse
declares himself “divorced,” the dissatisfied guild expels an unruly
member, and the game does not negotiate at all with the dissatis-
53. These contracts are roughly those governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C.
54. See, e.g., The Owner’s Ultima Online Cheats Guide, at http://www.theowner.org/
(on file with the New York Law School Law Review) (offering to sell a guide listing
“complete with mapped location of every rare [item] and their spawn times!”).
55. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 40 (describing these agreements as fit for
“contract law”).
56. See EQ Weddings, at http://www.expage.com/weddingscripts (last updated Jan.
13, 2002) (containing scripts for weddings between different character classes in Ever-
Quest); Nicholas Yee, The Norrathian Scrolls: A Study of EverQuest, at http://www.nickyee.
com/eqt/relate.html (last visited June 21, 2004) (surveying EverQuest players about
role-playing romantic relationships); Nicholas Yee, An Ethnography of MMORPG Wed-
dings, at http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/archives/000467.php (last visited Oct. 4,
2004).
57. I suspect that the lack of in-game births, true joint or community property,
and true death (and therefore no need for estate planning) has much to do with the
rarity of pre-marital agreements.
58. See, e.g., Star Wars Galaxies Manual § 5.5 — Skills and Professions, at http://star
warsgalaxies.station.sony.com/manual_detail.jsp?id=56845 (last visited Oct. 14, 2004)
(including such professions as “droid engineer,” “image designer,” and “pikeman”).
59. E.g., Science of War Application Requirements, at http://www.scienceofwar.net/
appform/ (last visited June 6, 2004) (listing seventeen criteria for admission, together
with profession-specific requirements).
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fied farmer.  Self-help and ongoing negotiation are more the order
of the day than enforceable agreements.60
One model, then, would be that games represent worlds that
are relational rather than contractual.  Certainly the extensive gift
economies that flow through many games, often coexisting quite
comfortably with market economies, express something of this
sense.61  The norm of generosity to newbies is quite pervasive.62
Even in Ultima Online’s early Wild West days, when new players
were considered easy marks, they were often still the beneficiaries
of repeated gifts from more experienced players.
Guilds, where patron-client networks are perhaps strongest,63
also illustrate this through their relationship with their members.
While guilds have been compared to organized crime gangs,64 it
might be more accurate to think of them as quasi-feudal.  Certainly,
the tendency among top EverQuest guilds towards evaluating mem-
bers for periods that verge on indentured servitude in exchange for
spoils and protection has something of the lord-vassal
relationship.65
Perhaps we cannot see contract law when we look at games be-
cause the contract is not the right abstraction for expressing the
nature of relationships in virtual worlds.  In terms of Henry Maine’s
famous dichotomy,66 it is at least plausible to claim that these games
are worlds of “status,” not of “contract.”  In a formal sense, every-
thing pertaining to a character is wrapped up in a few thousand
60. See ELLICKSON, supra note 34.
61. See generally MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT (1954) (providing information on gift
economies). NATALIE ZEMON DAVIS, THE GIFT IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE (2000)
(giving an example of the potential coexistence of gift and contractual economies).
62. See, e.g., The Gift and Generosity of Buffs, at http://www.mythicarealms.com/fo-
rums/index.php?showtopic=1022 (last updated Oct. 13, 2003); Lizard, Kill Bunnies, Sell
Meat, Kill More Bunnies, WIRED 6.05 (1998), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/
archive/6.05/bunnies_pr.html.
63. See, e.g., Everlore — A Deeper Look into EverQuest, at http://www.everlore.com/
links/default.asp (last visited June 6, 2004) (stating, under Arcane and Honor, “We
often give gifts to each other. We believe that gifts should be passed to other members
when no longer needed. We believe that gifts should never be sold without permission
of the giver.”).
64. Mikael Jakobsson & T.L. Taylor, The Sopranos Meets EverQuest: Social Networking
in Massively Multiplayer Online Games, FINEART FORUM 17:8 (2003), available at http://
www.fineartforum.org/Backissues/Vol_17/faf_v17_n08/reviews/jakobsson.html.
65. See MILSOM, supra note 37, at 88-126.
66. See HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861).
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bytes of data stored on one of the game’s servers.  Who is Adelaida?
What are her legal rights?  How does the game treat her?  Those
thousand bytes of status supply all the answers.  This status defines
most of her position within player society as well.  Her appearance,
her level, her experience — all of these qualities are visible, objec-
tive, and inalienable.  She can hide her wealth or transfer it, but it
too is a number on a server somewhere.  Most factors that would
draw other players to her are inherent in herself, not in her rela-
tionships with others.
B. Deliberate Unrealities and Conspicuous Consumption
This discussion of the importance of status and relation raises a
larger question about the reality of virtual economies.  Returning to
the observation that games are worlds of status and not of contract,
observe that level and skills are meaningless if all levels and all skills
are equal.  The very possibility of greater or lesser success is part of
what makes a game a game.67
There is something subtly askew between games and reality in
this respect, however.  Every player in a virtual world starts out a
pauper.68  Upward mobility in terms of the objective indicia of sta-
tus (wealth, level, skills) is not just possible or typical, but almost
inevitable.  Players demand this possibility as part of a narratively
satisfying game experience.  This sort of universal progress can only
be provided through truly enormous economic subsidies.  Start
with the welfare program; no one can starve — no one.69  Home-
67. Edward Castronova, On Virtual Economies, GAME STUDIES vol. 3, no. 2 (Dec.
2003), available at http://www.gamestudies.org/0302/castronova/ (“[I]n a normal
market the demanders are willing to pay money to have constraints removed, but in a
games market they will pay money to have constraints imposed.”); Robert Shapiro, Fan-
tasy Economics: Why Economists Are Obsessed With Online Role-Playing Games, at http://slate.
msn.com/id/2078053/ (last updated Feb. 4, 2003). Cf. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF
MORAL SENTIMENTS 51-60 (Liberty Fund 1984) (1759) (connecting material ambition to
the desire to be looked upon favorably by others).
68. See, e.g., EverQuest Manual, supra note 4, at § 3.3 (stating that new players begin
with “20 Bread cakes and 20 skins of milk” and a weapon).
69. This fact, startling in real-life terms, is generally considered so obvious in vir-
tual worlds that it is rarely mentioned. See Adrenaline Vault Featured Game Interview, at
http://www.avault.com/featured/everquest/interview4.asp (last visited June 21, 2004)
(“Food and drink are important if you want your endurance to regenerate, which is
important because it allows you to fight more effectively and also to flee from battle.
But you don’t actually starve to death, or take damage from lack of nourishment.”) Cf.
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lessness is not a problem; no one ever dies from exposure.  Not only
do players have few daily expenses, they often have all but guaran-
teed incomes, thanks to the price supports offered by non-player
merchants.  After Ultima Online’s famous (and disastrous) experi-
ment with limiting the supply side,70 few games are willing to im-
pose strict conservation laws on the scarcity of items or money.71
When a government lets the money supply increase like this, the
natural result is severe inflation.72  The Norrathian plat loses a
quarter of its value annually.73  It is not only money that loses value.
With enough time, everything in a game’s market becomes worth-
less as the supply expands to meet even the most marginal
demand.74
The typical designer response is to expand the world, adding
new quests, monsters, items, and other status markers.75  These new
Greg Lastowka, Maslow Short-Circuited, at http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/
2003/10/maslow_shortcir.html (Oct. 13, 2003) (“The avatar’s typist can surely starve
and die, but nothing in a virtual world will feed or protect the typist.”).
70. The history of that experiment is recounted, most memorably, in Elizabeth
Kolbert, Pimps and Dragons: How An Online World Survived A Social Breakdown, THE NEW
YORKER, May 28, 2001, http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?010528fa_FACT.
71. Some recent games have tried to break out of this model with property-based
taxation and redistribution. See James Wagner Au, Tax Revolt in Americana!, at http://
secondlife.com/notes/2003_08_11_archive.php#20030812 (last updated Aug. 12,
2003); James Grimmelmann, On the Second Life Tax Revolt, at http://research.yale.edu/
lawmeme/modules.php?name=news&file=article&sid=1222 (Sept. 21, 2003). There has
also been a decrease in the number of game-set prices. See, e.g., Raph Koster, Economic
Models, at http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2003/10/economic_models.html
(Oct. 14, 2003) (“SWG uses a faucet/drain but with the interesting wrinkle that the only
game-set prices in the entire thing are for a few drains, and a minor (and statistically
insignificant, at the moment) source of income from junk dealer shopkeepers.”).
72. Technically, because the supply of goods is also untethered, the in-game
prices may not necessarily change.  But the value of both in-game money and in-game
goods will be falling against outside measures, such as the US dollar.
73. Compare Castronova, supra note 27, at 33-35, with Edward Castronova, New Bout
of Inflation in EverQuest, at http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2003/12/new_
bout_of_inf.html (Dec. 16, 2003).
74. See, e.g., Slithy_Tove, Comments on # 15953, at http://www.metafilter.com/
mefi/15953#251709 (Mar. 30, 2002) (“[T]here seemed to be a steady, mild, deflation-
ary trend for large items.”).  Such “large items” are the ones requiring significant time
or investment to acquire, and are therefore useful as wealth or as status markers.
75. See, e.g., EverQuest Expansions, at http://www.everquestplatinum.net/expan-
sions/ (last visited June 21, 2004) (listing, in chronological order, major expansions to
EverQuest); UO Stratics — Age of Shadows Official FAQ, at http://uo.stratics.com/con-
tent/aos/officialfaq.shtml (last visited June 21, 2004) (describing Age of Shadows ex-
pansion to Ultima Online); Shadowbane Reader Review, at http://rr.pc.ign.com/rr/003/
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markers will be just as subject to rapid collapses in value as the old
ones, but at least initially, they are quite scarce, simply because al-
most no one will have gotten their hands on them.  Even later, at
any given point in time, they are comparatively scarcer than the old
symbols.  This shift makes them more valuable and insures that
there remains at least something of value in the game, even if its
identity is shifting.  Sometimes, these new items are placed into the
game through direct sale, at exorbitant prices, with the goal of suck-
ing some of the money back out of the game.76  Ultima Online re-
sponded to a bug that glutted its money supply overnight by
introducing fabulously expensive hair dye, completely useless for
anything except showing that a player had enough money to afford
it.77  Having introduced horses — to ride them, players needed to
purchase expensive bridles. EverQuest introduced giant rideable
lizards — to ride them, players needed to purchase equally expen-
sive drums.78
Game designers often refer to these expansions as “keeping
the game interesting for the advanced player.”79  That they cer-
tainly do.  But once the advanced players have mastered the chal-
lenges of a particular expansion and are clamoring for another, the
expansion still remains in the game for the almost-advanced play-
ers, the not-quite-almost-advanced players, the intermediate players,
and so on.80
003487.html (Nov. 27, 2003) (complaining about “minimal content” in “pathetic” ex-
pansion to Shadowbane).
76. See, e.g., Tom Chick, MMOs: Building Whole Societies, at http://www.gamespy.
com/amdmmog/week5/index2.shtml (last visited June 21, 2004) (quoting a Dark Age
of Camelot designer as saying, “You got classes, in the Marxist sense of the word.  Natu-
rally, starting a game where you’re lower-lower class is not very inspiring.  What we tried
to do was offer luxury goods that were so overpriced that they drained money from the
game.”).
77. See Kolbert, supra note 70.
78. Sylvene Firebrand, An EverQuest Guide to Horses, at http://eq.stratics.com/con-
tent/gameplay/guides/horses.shtml (last visited June 21, 2004).
79. Wes Connell, Re: [MUD-Dev] Expansion Packs, at http://www.kanga.nu/
archives/MUD-Dev-L/2002Q4/msg00453.php (Dec. 9, 2002) (“The majority of expan-
sion packs are aimed for the advanced player of that specific game . . . Usually, by the
time the player “needs” an expansion pack the player has the ability to “use” the expan-
sion pack.”).
80. See, e.g., Thott, The Kunark Problem, at http://www.afterlifeguild.org/Thott/
kunark.php (last visited June 21, 2004) (complaining about the quantity of new content
in Ruins of Kunark, the first expansion pack for EverQuest, in the context of a rant
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It seems that elite players, pushing at the bounds of what has
been done within the game, signal their elite status by acquiring
rare items, which gradually become less rare and leak down to
other players.  By combining continual expansion of the game uni-
verse (necessary to keep high-level players supplied with new ways
to signal their high status) with continual expansion in the “supply”
of all achievements (necessary to keep lower-level players supplied
with the ability to raise their own status) game designers effectively
lock their games into a treadmill of competitive consumption.81
The use to players of dyed red hair and riding lizards is primarily as
symbols of their owner’s wealth, and indirectly as symbols of the
player’s skill in playing the game.
C. Conclusion
This section has told three stories about contract law in games.
First, contracts do not exist in virtual worlds because the institu-
tional prerequisites for contractual enforcement are absent.  Sec-
ond, contracts are a poor fit to the relational, status-based nature of
interaction in these game worlds.  Third, the absence of contracts
in virtual worlds is a result of the significant skew between the social
function of game wealth and its actual value.  Any, or all, of these
stories could be right, or wrong.  Better research along these lines
will tell us something deeper about the nature of these virtual
economies.
IV. VIRTUAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATION
As I will explain shortly, I am not particularly interested in the
content of criminal law in virtual worlds.  Thanks to some very
sharp work by others at the State of Play conference, virtual crimi-
nal law is basically a solved problem. I do, however, think that talk-
ing about the problems of imposing effective punishments on
wrongdoers opens up a whole slew of interesting and interrelated
issues.  In this Part, I will sketch two of them.
First, what does it take to make punishments effective?  Here,
virtuality imposes some interesting constraints, ones that might be
about the speed at which players can achieve the new, higher, maximum “level” opened
to players with Kunark).
81. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899).
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usefully reflected upon in thinking about criminal law elsewhere.
Second, who defines what counts as “wrongdoing” and how do they
define it?  Trying to decipher how individual player opinions be-
come the opinions of some larger local community of players leads
to tough problems about the nature of guilds and other voluntary
associations in virtual worlds.  Both of these discussions will stray far
from the theme of “criminal law,” but it provides a useful jumping-
off point.
A. Virtual Crime and Punishment
Greg Lastowka and Dan Hunter’s article for the conference,82
in conjunction with some of Raph Koster’s observations,83 has not
only defined the field of substantive virtual criminal law, but has
also largely sewn up the doctrinal outlines.  All that remain are
game-specific details of less theoretical interest.
Lastowka and Hunter define all virtual crime as some form of
griefing,84 a definition that makes sense.  On the one hand, thanks
to the wildly varied set of rules and conventions for games, it is not
possible to identify specific acts as right or wrong in a way that holds
true across games.  Games with extensive player-versus-player fea-
tures, for example, simply do not understand avataricide as mur-
der.85  On the other hand, virtually any act can become an offense
in the right context.  Raph Koster uses the example of standing in
the wrong place, if that place happens to be blocking someone
else’s door.86  The right response to the question of “what is a vir-
82. Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Virtual Crimes (Draft 3) (Nov. 6, 2003),
available at http://www.nyls.edu/pdfs/lastowka.pdf.
83. Raph Koster, A Philosophical Statement on Playerkilling, at http://www.
legendmud.org/raph/gaming/pkphilosophy.html (last visited June 21, 2004); Raph
Koster, The Man Behind the Curtain, at http://www.legendmud.org/raph/gaming/es-
say5.html (May 11, 1998) [hereinafter Man Behind the Curtain].
84. See Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 82, at 14-21.
85. Indeed, in the limiting case — first-person shooters — killing other avatars is
the entire object of the game. See also Richard A. Bartle, A Wish List for Massive Mul-
tiplayer Games, at http://www.mud.co.uk/richard/og01.htm (Sept. 2001) (“The prob-
lem, as with player death, is unsolicited PvP.”).
86. Man Behind the Curtain, supra note 83.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-1\NLR108.txt unknown Seq: 22  8-DEC-04 12:08
168 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
tual crime?” turns out to be “any activity that genuinely bothers
most players of the game in question.”87
Notice how this definition (appropriately, I think) renders fu-
tile the task of developing any general doctrine of virtual criminal
law.88  It asks us to look to the circumstances of a particular game
and its gaming community to see what the model player of that
game regards as wrongful conduct.89  Every game has some notion
of community and anti-social conduct, and therefore, some notion
of punishing such conduct.  However, beyond these bare outlines it
is hard to say very much about which actions will be considered
criminal and on what basis.90
When we look at the mechanisms by which players might en-
force their notions of fair play and good behavior, an odd paradox
emerges.  The set of unpleasant and wrongful acts players might
wish to deter is identical to the set of unpleasant and effective sanc-
tions available as deterrence.  To prevent violence, annoyance, and
non-cooperation, players can engage in violence, annoyance, or
non-cooperation.
Of course, this symmetry applies to real life crimes as well, but
in real life, there are incredibly severe punishments available —
murder is by no means the worst weapon in the human arsenal.
The state’s monopoly on violence has several functions, one of
which is to ensure that most crimes can be punished with sanctions
more severe than the crime itself.  In a game world, on the other
hand, there is simply less at stake.  It is impossible to punish a crimi-
nal beyond the value she places on continuing to remain in the
game because she can always respond by quitting.91
87. Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 82, at 15 (“Griefing is . . . all behaviors which
are perpetrated within virtual society merely with the express intent [to] bring sadistic
pleasure to the perpetrator through the suffering and emotional distress of others.”).
88. Id.  Indeed, Hunter and Lastowka observe that this definition is a close (if not
exact) fit with “disorderly conduct,” as defined by the Model Penal Code.  The entirety
of virtual criminal law, then, has been subsumed within § 250.2 of the Code.
89. Id. at 16 (“[W]e need some basis for concluding whether given actions are
criminal by the standards of the [virtual] community.”).
90. See Castronova, supra note 2, at 8; Edward Castronova, Theory of the Avatar,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper.cfm?abstract_id=385103 (Feb. 2003);
See generally KATIE SALEN & ERIC ZIMMERMAN, RULES OF PLAY: GAME DESIGN FUNDAMEN-
TALS, ch. 27 (2003), available at http://www.nyls.edu/docs/zimmerman.pdf (describing
the “immersive fallacy” and pointing out the constructed nature of virtual spaces).
91. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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Further, in real life, one of the principal justifications for incar-
ceration is its usefulness as a form of incapacitation:  A criminal in
prison is a danger only to others in prison.  By contrast, in a game
community designed for the mass consumer market, incapacita-
tion, even through expelling players, is largely ineffectual.  The an-
noyed player can simply quit the game and start a new account;
present technology does not easily allow a game company to detect
such behavior.92
What is really going on, then, in virtual worlds, is a very deli-
cate balancing act in terms of the amount of power players have to
pester each other.  Too little or too much and the griefers will run
wild, either because they can wreak enormous amounts of havoc
before they are stopped or because they cannot be stopped at all.93
In deterrence terms, what a virtual world needs, in some sense, is a
properly graded scheme of punishments.94  For conduct that is only
bothersome to one player, only mild sanctions need to be at that
player’s disposal, such as verbal ripostes and perhaps minor destruc-
tiveness.  But conduct that the community decides is wrong needs
to be punishable with more severe sanctions, such as banishment
from the company of other players or the complete blocking of the
wrongdoer’s individual progress in the game.  The key is that the
community as a whole needs sanctions not available to individuals.
Raph Koster has hypothesized that the wider the range of re-
sponses available to players, the more effective community self-reg-
92. I am mostly concerned with player self-regulation.  Game designers, of course,
have freer hands. See J.R. Suler & W. Phillips, The Bad Boys of Cyberspace: Deviant Behavior
in Online Multimedia Communities and Strategies for Managing It (Sept. 1997), at http://
www.rider.edu/~suler/psycyber/badboys.html.  But too much use (or abuse) of de-
signer power creates its own problems. See infra Part V.
93. This is the situation in deathmatch-style first-person shooters, in which it is
essentially impossible to build up any accomplishment that cannot be taken away with
one well-placed grenade.  Taking away the accomplishments of others with well-placed
grenades is the competitive point of such games; looking to them for examples of
player self-regulation through judicious use of force is looking in the wrong place.  A
better example of such out-of-control contexts would be chatrooms on services without
“ignore” features, where one foul-mouthed visitor can ruin everyone else’s experience.
It is not surprising that successful IM services and MUDs almost always have an ignore
feature.
94. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BEN-
THAM, pt. II, bk. 1, ch. 6 (Athlone Press 1962) (“Rule IV. The punishment should be
adjusted in such manner to each particular offence, that for every part of the mischief
there may be a motive to restrain the offender from giving birth to it.”).
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ulation will be.95  There is some plausible evidence from various
games’ experiments with having different rule sets on different serv-
ers to support this hypothesis.  It is an open secret that Sony devotes
significantly less in customer service resources to EverQuest servers
that allow players to commit acts of violence against each other,
suggesting that the increased possibility of player control over
others reduces the need for administrative intervention.96  A more
detailed study of this problem across the whole slate of current
games is likely to be quite fruitful in pointing out the characteristics
of good game design.
B. The Puzzle of Guilds
So far in this discussion, I have been acting as though “the
community” has no difficulty acting in concert against genuine
wrongdoers.  But such an account is highly problematic.  Many
games have had trouble getting this balance right because griefers
form communities too.97  There is a critically important, if not very
well understood, connection between player grouping and individ-
ual behavior.  I submit that whoever understands the nature of
guilds will understand the nature of community and community
norm-enforcement in modern virtual worlds.
Every major game has some variant on the guild concept.98
EverQuest has guilds and raid parties,99 Asheron’s Call has alle-
giance hierarchies,100 Star Wars Galaxies has player associations,101
and many games have more complex systems.  Across these dispa-
95. Man Behind the Curtain, supra note 83.
96. On this question, see Vladimir Cole, Re: [MUD-Dev] A Question on PvP and PK,
at  http://www.kanga.nu/archives/MUD-Dev-L/2002Q3/msg00124.php (July 15,
2002).  Ultima Online, after great hand-wringing, split into a PvP server and a non-PvP
server. See Kolbert, supra note 70. See generally WoW Warcry — Content — PvP, at http://
wow.warcry.com/content/pvp/ (last visited June 21, 2004) (listing various types of
player-vs-player schemes).
97. See JC Soprano, Now the City is Mine: Interview with Urizenus, THE ALPHAVILLE
HERALD, Jan. 14, 2004, at http://www.alphavilleherald.com/archives/000089.html; Ul-
tima Online Travelogues, at http://www.aschulze.net/ultima/stories9/release1.htm (last
updated Sept. 2002).
98. I will call all such groups “guilds” for convenience.
99. EverQuest Manual, supra note 4, at §§ 19-20.
100. Asheron’s Call — Tips — The Allegiance Primer, at http://classic.zone.msn.com/
asheronscall/tips/ASHEtipsallegiance.asp (last visited June 21, 2002).
101. Star Wars Galaxies Manual, supra note 58, at §§ 10, 15.5.
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rate games, guilds almost always have several important features in
common: the games make some explicit provision for their exis-
tence, the powers granted to them by the games are very weak, and
yet they are somehow key to the social energy of a virtual world.
Scholars of virtual worlds need to develop theories about the
emergent properties of guilds.  We need an account of why guilds
seem to be so important in server-level politics and of how players
inside guilds interact.  Further, we need to understand how game
software becomes social, specifically, how the choices made by
game designers in creating guild systems turn into the surprisingly
prominent guilds we know and love.  An account of this form, I
believe, will tell us what is really going on as the Sims Shadow Gov-
ernment and the Sims Mafia struggle to define what is “right” and
what is “griefing” in The Sims Online.102
First, there is the null hypothesis that people join guilds for the
same reason they join any other group.  On this view, guilds don’t
present any special problems; they’re just another example of gen-
eral phenomena in the study of social groups.  People are hard-
wired to be social, so any software environments capable of support-
ing sociability will intrinsically also support, and indeed create, so-
cial groups.103  Guilds will often be created by people who know
each other in real life.104  Accordingly, there is no important way in
which they differ from other groups.
102. At the time of the State of Play conference, the consensus was that the SSG was
in the ascendant and would soon dominate server politics. See Mia Wallace, History of the
Sims Shadow Government, Part 1: The Prehistory of SSG: Interview with Urizenus, THE AL-
PHAVILLE HERALD, Dec. 14, 2003, at http://www.alphavilleherald.com/archives/000059.
html.  That expectation, however, seems to have been unfounded; the SSG has since
collapsed, leaving a potential power vacuum. See Urizenus, Snowwhite and — Storm Re-
sign SSG: Is It the End?, THE ALPHAVILLE HERALD, Jan. 12, 2004, at http://www.alphavil-
leherald.com/archives/000084.html; Urizenus, Interview With Former SSG General, Storm,
THE ALPHAVILLE HERALD, Jan. 13, 2004, at http://www.alphavilleherald.com/archives/
000086.html; Urizenus, Alphaville Braces for Mafia Wars, THE ALPHAVILLE HERALD, Jan.
14, 2004, at http://www.alphavilleherald.com/archives/000088.html.
103. See Clay Shirky, Social Software and the Politics of Groups, at http://shirky.com/
writings/group_politics.html (May 9, 2003).
104. See, e.g., Emerald Templars — An Everquest Guild, at http://www.emeraldtem-
plars.org/about.php (last visited June 21, 2004); Phoenix Lords — An Everquest Guild of
Friends on the Mithaniel Marr Server, at http://phoenixlords.8k.com/code.html (last vis-
ited June 21, 2004); The Cult of Xen, at http://www.cultofxen.com/modules.php?name=
news&file=article&sid=43&mode=&order=0&thold=0 (last visited June 21, 2004).
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This description is useful in reminding us that not every aspect
of guild life is unique to guilds and that not every feature of guilds
requires a purposive explanation.  Nonetheless, its explanatory
power is weak.  We need an explanation that makes sense of the
fact that where there is code-level support for guilds, they tend very
strongly to displace other, potentially competing, social groups.105
We might, for example, understand guilds as groups optimized
to minimize transaction costs.106  Based on this view, players form
guilds to help them accomplish important tasks cooperatively.  The
hard part about cooperation is making sure that others are playing
along.  A guild’s real “use” is its ability to reduce the difficulty of
knowing the many other players on the server to the simpler task of
knowing only the players in your guild.  Larger size guilds allow for
larger in-game challenges, but they are increasingly more difficult
to organize.107  Here, the code-level features are the kernels around
which social groups crystallize.
It is also important to pay attention to the negotiations and
relations among guilds.  Take for example, the coordination prob-
lem for EverQuest raids.  In a raid, a group of players go to a highly
dangerous area and systematically kill the monsters there.  Good
raid strategy involves close coordination and patience. If a raiding
party draws the attention of too many monsters at once, it is likely
to be slaughtered.  For this reason, it is safer and easier for one
group to raid a given area than for two distinct groups to try at the
same time.108  The structure of EverQuest raids thus creates a clas-
105. See Google Web Directory, at http://directory.google.com/Top/Games/Video_
Games/Roleplaying/Massive_Multiplayer_Online/EverQuest_Games/EverQuest/ (last
visited Oct. 14, 2004).  The Google Web Directory lists 494 EverQuest guilds with web
sites. The entire EverQuest section available at the same web address lists only 708 sites
total.  The vast majority of non-guild sites are commercial or otherwise not reflective of
in-game communities.
106. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
107. See Vincent Archer, Re: [MUD-Dev] MMORPGs & MUDS, at http://www.kanga.
nu/archives/MUD-Dev-L/2002Q1/msg00159.php (Jan. 15, 2002) (taxonomizing sizes
and motivations of  EverQuest guilds). See generally James Grimmelmann, Five Ways of
Looking at a Guild, at http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php?name=news&
file=article&sid=1253 (Oct. 14, 2003) (discussing issues of guild size and group
cohesion).
108. See generally Neferti, Neferti’s EverQuest Raid Info Page, at http://www.geocities.
com/neferaza/raids.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).  Having multiple groups raiding
nearby also increases the risk of monsters attacking weak members of a raid party, as
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sic coordination problem for which websites have emerged to han-
dle the necessary cooperation.  These raid calendars allow raiding
parties to reserve zones for future raids.109 Since these sites are en-
tirely independent of the game itself, they have available to them
only those sanctions that guilds can enforce against other guilds.
The most notable of these sanctions, of course, is the ability to ruin
another group’s raid with well-timed interference, drawing mon-
sters out into open combat before the raiding group is prepared to
fight them.
I suspect that we are witnessing the bottom-up emergence of
governing institutions in games, as catalyzed by whatever code-level
features the games offer for guild formation.  Of course, what we
currently have is quasi-feudal: allegiance hierarchies which start to
become powerful entities in their own right.110  However, many
EverQuest shards have developed “uberguilds”111 which are the
clearinghouses for inter-guild disputes, and there is speculation
that Maxis is in the process of losing effective authority over The
Sims Online.112  The political relationship between these increas-
ingly powerful guilds and game designers also needs explication.
There is something incongruous about the trend towards in-
creasingly important guild extensions.  “Player towns,” essentially
guild-owned gated communities, are one of the most hyped fea-
well as causing performance problems (due to the large number of players) that can
cause dangerous slowness and difficulty responding to threats.
109. See, e.g., Everquest Luclin Event Calendar, at http://everquest.estoncom.com/
luclin/index.shtml (last visited June 21, 2004).
110. See, e.g.,  Kiirnai, To Tread or Not To Tread (Mill, That Is . . . ), at http://www.
warcraftcentral.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-1921 (last visited Oct. 14, 2004);
Sintour and Ferall, Comments to Topic: Brell Uberguild?, at http://vnboards.ign.com/
Brell_Serilis_Board/b5013/57463849/?1 (Oct. 2003); see generally Mike Sellers, Creating
Effective Groups and Group Roles in MMP Games, at http://www.gamasutra.com/re-
source_guide/20020916/sellers_01.htm (Sept. 16, 2002); Myschyf et al, Myschyf’s Round-
table: Economic and Political Systems in MMORPGs, at http://www.legendmud.org/raph/
gaming/myschyf2.html (last visited June 21, 2004).
111. See Scott Jennings, RE: [MUD-Dev] D&D vs. MMORPG “Complexity”, at http://
www.kanga.nu/archives/MUD-Dev-L/2003Q2/msg00102.php (Apr. 16, 2003).
112. See, e.g., Urizenus, Interview with Anonymous, on Alphaville’s Bondage, Discipline &
Sadomasochism Community, THE ALPHAVILLE HERALD, Dec. 20, 2003, at http://www.al-
phavilleherald.com/archives/000066.html.  At the State of Play conference, there were
questions from the audience during the “Governance” panel directed to the possibility
of Maxis needing to negotiate with the Sims Shadow Government over policy changes,
but video and transcripts from the conference are not yet available.
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tures hurtling towards the market.113  Other games are trying to de-
vise richer political systems, including elections, mayors, factions in
conflict, explicit patron-client relationships, and other simulations
of real-world governments and states.  Within limits, it seems almost
as though new games are in a race to create territorial sovereigns in
their games’ code.
And yet, the question arises:  If a game had a rich enough so-
cial universe, why would it need any of these features?  Isn’t the
need to implement elections in code a sign that the game is too flat
to allow players to institute their own elections?  Conversely, isn’t
there something artificial about an election held through game
code?  Is anything really at stake, or is it just another quest for play-
ers in the same way that killing a dragon in the mountains would
be?
C. Conclusion
This section has asked two related questions in the administra-
tion of justice by players:  What punishments are available, and what
institutions decide when to use these punishments?  To the first
question, my answer is that players generally must use retaliation in
kind.  And to the second, my answer is that guilds are often the
locus of effective decision-making power among players.  Taken to-
gether, these answers suggest that guilds provide an important link
between the positive pleasure of playing a social game and the neg-
ative task of making other players play nicely.  For lawyers used to
dealing with real-life interactions and institutions, neither of these
problems is a genuinely new one.  Since guilds are implicated in
both, they may provide useful insights in thinking about crime and
its effective punishment.
V. THE GOD PROBLEM
Every living person retains the memory, and perhaps the
lasting anxiety, of a time of helplessness, when as a child
he was in the hands, and at the mercy, of beings enor-
mously stronger and more capable than himself, whose
113. See, e.g., SWG Housing System, SWG Stratics, at http://swg.stratics.com/content/
gameplay/guides/guides.php?Cat=8&vid=49 (last visited Oct. 14, 2004) (describing
Star Wars Galaxies system of player-run towns).
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purposes were often hard to comprehend and not always
easy to share, and who seemed to combine, in perplexing
and unpredictable ways, underlying benevolence with oc-
casional injustice.114
Although this quotation is ostensibly about children and par-
ents, Jasper Griffin uses that relationship as a metaphor, a way of
capturing the terrifying powerlessness that characterized the an-
cient Greek conception of the relationship between mortals and
gods.  The gods possessed (and frequently used) their awesome
powers to shape the lives of men, but were largely unrestrained by
any force of compassion or ethics.  Oedipus, acting out a tragic
script he had done nothing to “deserve,” could complain of his ill-
treatment to no higher authority.
The relationship of powerless mortal to potentially capricious
god is well-understood in the context of virtual worlds.  Whether
the designers who control game software and game servers are
called “gods,” “wizards,” “sysops,” or “GMs,” players are inescapably
in their hands and at their mercy.  As well-meaning as designers
may be towards their game communities, as long as there are any
designers, someone will have the power to pull the plug.  In the real
world, even the most arbitrary dictator is still limited to those orders
he can bribe, bedazzle, brainwash, or bully someone into carrying
out.  Code knows no such qualms.  In the real world, even a govern-
ment that tries to abrogate all property rights will face the intracta-
ble problem of trying to wrest items from their possessors.  Virtual
possession, however, provides no such protection.  While virtual
rights can be made inviolable as against other players, they are com-
pletely meaningless as against the designer.  The search for some
kind of check on this power has been a recurring theme through-
out the history of virtual worlds.
Placing checks on seemingly overweening power is also a recur-
ring theme in legal scholarship concerning governments.  Constitu-
tional lawyers, cyberspace theorists, and international lawyers all
deal with the bogeyman of the sovereign who answers to no higher
authority and who therefore cannot be directly compelled to do
right.  Yet these bodies of law have all identified and named tech-
niques that might be used to bribe, to shame, or to threaten the
114. Jasper Griffin, It’s all Greek!, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 18, 2003, at 64.
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sovereign and to place limits on its capriciousness.  In this section, I
will trace out some of the major strands of thinking about real-life
versions of this “god problem” and identify how these various forms
of restraint might appear in games.
A. A Cyberspace Approach: Market Exit
Virtual worlds are not democratic.  It is true that the designers
could hold elections among players and promise to be bound by
the results, but such promises can always be broken.  At the end of
the day, all such referenda are never more than advisory.115  To put
this point another way, at least since Locke, the legitimacy of repub-
lican government has been intertwined with the right of revolu-
tion.116  If the government refuses to obey the results of an election,
it must expect the citizenry to rise up and depose.  But there is no
way to depose the designers of a game.
This is not to say that game designers are entirely free to act as
tyrants.  If they do, players will leave the game.  If we have respect
for players’ autonomy, their continued willingness to play must
count for something.  Indeed, any game dependent on players for
its revenue will have very strong incentives not to frustrate the
strong desires of a majority for too long.117  Players, as a single col-
115. A Tale in the Desert has gone through exactly this cycle; it promised to allow
players to vote on “laws.”  After a series of proposed referenda that would have altered
basic features of the game system, the designers backpedaled and declared certain “fea-
ture requests” off-limits. See A Tale in the Desert — Lawmaking Supplement, at http://www.
atitd.com/man-lawmaking.html (last visited June 22, 2004).  Note also that a suitably
motivated game company could bind itself through real world measures.  It could sign a
binding contract with players pledging to follow the results of elections; it could also be
incorporated with players as shareholders.
116. E.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. 19, sec. 222  (Hackett
Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690) (“Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fun-
damental rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly, or corruption, endeavor to
grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liber-
ties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had
put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a
right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative,
(such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and security, which is the end
for which they are in society.”) (emphasis added).
117. This observation has bite even when describing games maintained as a labor
of love.  Should every player quit, the “tyranny” of a game’s government becomes an
entirely metaphysical question.
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lective group, have power over designers through their exit option.
It is the virtual equivalent of emigration.118
The relative virtues and vices of these two forms of accountabil-
ity — the ability to replace a community’s leaders and the ability to
leave the community altogether — have been extensively debated
in the literature on “cyberspace self-governance.”  David Post and
David Johnson are closely identified with the claim that an exit op-
tion is normatively superior.119  Neil Netanel120 and Jack Gold-
smith,121 among others, have offered replies.122 I do not intend to
enter this debate on one side or the other.  Instead, I suggest that
virtual-world gaming communities have the potential to ground this
debate firmly in reality (or is it in virtuality?) by providing extensive
empirical evidence.  They are probably the best example of large-
scale cyberspace communities that have raised these issues directly.
As a result, two facts about the nature of quitting a game are
relevant.
First, such power is exercised outside of the game itself.  “Quit”
is not really a command in the game interface.123  This reaching-
out means that the dialectic between players and designers will
leave traces that are not visible within the game itself, therefore,
looking only at the virtual world provides an incomplete picture.
We cannot speak usefully about in-game politics without knowing
something about out-of-game relationships.  How much do players
118. On this theme, see generally James Grimmelmann, Life, Death, and Democracy
Online, at http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php?name=news&file=article&
sid=1239 (Sept. 28, 2003).
119. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders — The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1398-99 (1996); David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and
the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art 3 (1995).
120. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal
Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395 (2000).
121. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998). But
see David G. Post, Against “Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365 (2002).
122. See Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Redis-
covering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998).
123. Every game interface, of course, contains “log out” or some similar command
to end a game session.  But a player who logs out can easily log in again later on and
resume playing.  A player who has quit a game, on the other hand, has ceased to be
involved with it and can no longer participate directly in its virtual world.
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pay each month?124  What other games are available?125  How rich
are the message boards and fan sites players can use to talk about
their dissatisfactions?126
Second, the loss of players is much more of a continuum than
a binary up-or-down referendum.  In theory, designers will be sensi-
tive to the loss of even one player, while elected governments are
sensitive only to the loss of enough voters to deny them a majority.
In some sense then, the institutionalized avenue for voicing criti-
ques of government is to the government itself, rather than to other
citizens, since the goal is to persuade the government, rather than
to persuade an electorate.
B. An International Law Approach: Players and Investors
Another perspective on the “unlimited” power of game design-
ers comes from looking at the rise of real-life markets in virtual
items.127  In the real world, those who make investments in a coun-
try expose themselves to uniquely “sovereign” risks because of the
danger that the government might alter the laws under which they
claim to hold assets.128  Players find themselves in a similar relation-
ship with games because they are largely without recourse if the
designers change the game’s rules mid-stream.  However, like inves-
tors, they can bring a game to its knees if they collectively choose to
124. See Stratics Central, at http://www.stratics.com/cgi-bin/databases/games/
db.cgi?db=default&uid=default&view_records=1&sb=1&so=ascend&Phase=released
(last visited June 22, 2004) (containing a list of games annotated with monthly fees).
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., id. at http://www.stratics.com/.  The sidebar at the left links to sub-
sites with message boards for specific games.
127. See generally Julian Dibbell, Play Money — Diary of a Dubious Proposition, at http:/
/www.juliandibbell.com/playmoney/ (Apr. 21, 2004) (presenting weekly snapshots of
Ultima Online auctions at eBay); e.g., Julian Dibbell, Market Watch, at http://www.ju-
liandibbell.com/playmoney/2004_01_01_playmoney_archive.html#107349938376201
762 (Jan. 7, 2004); Julian Dibbell, EconoMUDtrics, at http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_
nova/2003/10/economudtrics.html (Oct. 8, 2003); see also Castronova, supra note 27;
eBay – Internet Games, at http://listings.ebay.com/aw/plistings/list/all/category1654/
index.html (last visited June 22, 2004).
128. See generally ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1051-1110 (2d ed.
1999).
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withdraw their support.129  I am not suggesting that we might actu-
ally apply the international law of sovereign expropriations to
games.  I am instead suggesting that this example of “unlimited”
power from the real world provides a useful analogy for thinking
about the powers of game designers.
Speaking loosely, we might call multiplayer games tourist econ-
omies because their principal wealth-creating activity is providing
pleasure for those who choose to vacation there.  Their incorporeal
nature means that they can’t make tangible goods capable of being
exported and that anything “made” in-game must stay there.130  On
the other hand, most games see capital, or hard currency, flowing
inexorably inwards.131  Players invest by paying monthly fees to its
government, the designers.  That government supplies various ser-
vices by converting the capital supplied by players into game infra-
structure.  New areas of the map, items available for purchase and
the merchants who sell them, and those infinitely respawning mon-
ster sites are all tourist-industry infrastructure.132
The “investors” in a game are in an interesting position.  They
cannot remove capital from the game once it has been spent on
internal improvements.  There are no goods susceptible to export
and their original investment partner, the game’s designers, will
not be willing to unwind the investment.  The best that a player-
investor can do is to make profits within the game’s economy and
then find a new player-investor willing to step into her shoes.  Posi-
tions cannot be liquidated, only transferred.  To leave a game, an
individual player-investor must find another player-investor in an
129. See generally Edward Castronova et al., The Coming MMORPG Crash, Or Not, at
http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2003/11/the_coming_mmor.html (Nov. 8,
2003) (discussing the economics of the virtual world marketplace).
130. See Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 1, at 51-56.
131. See Castronova, supra note 27, at 9-10 (discussing the business models of vir-
tual worlds).
132. To be more precise, the designers spend this hard currency paying program-
mer salaries and buying computers to serve as servers.  The money thus cycles back into
the “real” economy.  But notice that both of these sets of purchases are effectively irre-
versible: it is not possible to force a programmer to disgorge money back to the game
once she has been paid her salary.  Nor is it generally possible to sell off the game’s
servers for more than pennies on the dollar.  It is not much of a stretch to impute this
irreversibility to the higher-level conversion of investment dollars into in-game
infrastructure.
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offshore market who wishes to invest in the game to the same de-
gree as the leaving player-investor.
This fact leads to Julian Dibbell’s various observations about
the practical influence of “eBayers.”133  By allowing players to buy
their way into or out of a game with hard (real world) currency,
these markets tamper with the political climate of their games.  On
the one hand, allowing the liquidation of one’s stake in a game
makes players less bought-in to a game and less susceptible to its
control.  After all, as long as the game has not actually suspended
your account, you can always turn around, convert your character
and assets into cash, and walk away.  The effective threats that other
players can make against you134 are that much weaker.
Further, by allowing players to purchase their way into a
game,135 the presence of an offshore market changes the list of real-
world attributes that influence in-game success.  Without such mar-
kets, one’s success is mostly a function of one’s skill in playing and
one’s willingness to devote time to the game.  Where they exist,
however, wealthy players can leapfrog over poorer ones, purchasing
the symbols of success, rather than winning them directly.  If we
take the idea of conspicuous consumption136 seriously, those able
to purchase their way into high status will be competing with those
seeking to use skill or time.
For now, the calculus of a game designer is rather simple: max-
imize the number of players, and therefore settle disputes in which-
ever way will cause the fewest people to leave in annoyance.  Thus,
games expel griefers because each griefer threatens, if left un-
checked, to drive away multiple players.137  This policy does not al-
ways mean catering to the immediate requests of the many over the
requests of the few.  There are players who enrich the game world
and make the environment more enjoyable for others.  These play-
133. See Dibbell, supra note 2.
134. See infra Part IV.
135. See, e.g., IGE.com — About Us, at http://www.ige.com/aboutus- (last visited
June 22, 2004).
136. See infra part III.
137. See, e.g., Raph Koster, Small Worlds: Competitive and Cooperative Structures in
Online Worlds, at http://www.legendmud.org/raph/gaming/smallworlds.html (2003)
(“Given an aggressive group, kick them out of your game.  Otherwise, they will domi-
nate via genocide.”).
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ers are of special value to designers precisely because their effects
are reflected in the overall number of players.138
But many games are starting to break out of this form of equal-
ity.  They hope to capture for themselves some of the money that
currently goes to other players from those who buy their way in.
There.com is probably the most prominent example, but it is hardly
alone.139  Such changes undo the rough identity between the no-
tions of “citizen” and “investor.”  The great mass of low-paying regu-
lar players are now useful principally to the extent that they keep
the high-rollers happy.140  If driving away five $10 per month play-
ers causes a $100 per month player to double her spending, the
game administration will happily make such a trade.
Whether such changes will be stabilizing or destabilizing is a
fascinating question that requires us to think about the relationship
between real and virtual economies — between real and virtual so-
cieties. Thinking of the “god problem” from an international law
perspective on investors makes clear that it is hardly a one-sided
power dynamic. The players may have as much to fear from other
players’ influence on game designers as they do from the whimsy of
the designers themselves.
C. A Constitutional Approach: Rights
Game designers love to give other game designers advice.141
One of the most frequently given pieces of advice is that almost
nothing is more destructive to a thriving game community than reg-
138. See F. Randall Farmer, Habitat Anecdotes, at http://www.kanga.nu/archives/
MUD-Dev-L/1997Q2/msg00977.php (May 30, 1997).  On the relative roles of different
sorts of players, see generally Richard Bartle, Hearts, Clubs, Diamonds, Spades: Players Who
Suit MUDs, at http://www.mud.co.uk/richard/hcds.htm (June 1996).
139. Welcome to There!, at http://www.there.com (last visited June 22, 2004).  The
late 10SIX — so named for its ambition to have a million (i.e. 106) simultaneous players
— also attempted something similar. See Frank Crowell, Re: MUD-Dev[LED0], at http://
www.kanga.nu/archives/MUD-Dev-L/2000Q2/msg00534.php (Apr. 23, 2000).
140. To abuse the tourist-economy metaphor, the game now cares about the mass
of its populace only as a way to fill the supply of waitstaff, tour guides, and entertainers
demanded by the rich tourists to attend to them hand and foot.
141. See, e.g., MUD-Dev — Discussion of MUD System Design, Development, and Implemen-
tation, at https://www.kanga.nu/lists/listinfo/mud-dev/ (last visited June 22, 2004);
RICHARD BARTLE, DESIGNING VIRTUAL WORLDS (2003); JESSICA MULLIGAN & BRIDGETTE
PATROVSKY, DEVELOPING ONLINE GAMES: AN INSIDER’S GUIDE (2003).
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ular intervention by its designers.142  Since designers are not bound
by the same “laws” of code as regular players, their presence can be
destabilizing.  When designers engage in conduct not available to
players, it highlights their distance from players and their apparent
unaccountability.143
In political theory terms, this claim is striking.  Among the
most benevolent things a dictator can do is to refrain from exercis-
ing his powers.  It is more typical to object that dictatorial action is
unwise because it is unjust or ineffective than it is to appeal to the
unpleasant aesthetics of dictatorial fiat.  Yet this is precisely the con-
cern that animates designers.  “How can I convince my players to
like me?” is a much more common question than “What acts would
be most just for my players?”144
I think the game designers are on to something.  Rather than
try to force games into the wrong conceptual box by asking simply
how democratic, how efficient, or how just their rules are,145 we
should instead see whether real-life lawyers might have answers to
their questions.  In my opinion, the question that designers are ask-
ing is how can those who are already possessed of power best legiti-
mate their exercise of it.  A closer investigation into the ways in
which game companies use their powers (or refrain from using
their powers) and an explanation of this use of power in real-life
political terms are necessary.  I suspect that the “best practices” of
good games, ones which players think are basically fair, will closely
resemble some of the “best practices” of good governments.
142. E.g., Chip Morningstar & F. Randall Farmer, The Lessons of Lucasfilm’s Habitat,
in CYBERSPACE: FIRST STEPS (Michael Benedikt ed., 1990); Raph Koster, Declaring the
Rights of Players,  at http://www.legendmud.org/raph/gaming/playerrights.html (Aug.
27, 2000).
143. Morningstar & Farmer, supra note 142 (“Wherever possible, things that can be
done within the framework of the percipient level should be.”).
144. See MUD-Dev Mailing List Archive, at http://www.kanga.nu/archives/MUD-
Dev-L/ (last visited June 22, 2004).
145. The appropriateness of asking such questions of games was a major theme at
the conference.  Most notably, see Castronova, supra note 2.  For an overview of
presentations that touched on this theme, see James Grimmelmann, Free As in Gaming?,
at http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php?name=news&file=article&sid=
1290 (Dec. 4, 2003).
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For example, extensive literature exists on the theory and con-
tours of due process rights.146  Such rights do more than protect
people against government.  There is a strong argument that such
rights are an important technique for keeping democracy function-
ing and for legitimating government itself.147  Well-defined proce-
dures constrain the discretion of a decisionmaker and provide
assurances that decisions in general are made fairly, and not by
standards invented for a particular result in a particular case.
Within a given case, such requirements as a written record, notice
of the charges, and the “rule of law” more generally provide a cru-
cial sense of auditability.  Any complaint about the fairness of the
result can be answered effectively with a peremptory reference to
the existing record and the governing law.
For similar reasons, administrative agencies issue guidance
documents not only to put others on notice of the applicable law,
but also to send a signal that they are constraining their own discre-
tion with respect to particular issues.148  One of the main tech-
niques that legitimates designer intervention in games is when such
intervention is understood to be reserved to certain offenses, most
often those involving offensive speech, commercialization, or grief-
ing, which the administration has officially stated are its business.149
146. For a reasonable overview of the shape of due process in historical context,
see Cynthia R. Farnia, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189 (1991).
147. Thus, for example, John Hart Ely’s famous Democracy and Distrust, although
principally about the democratic process and the role of judicial review in keeping
democratic institutions responsive to popular will, opens with a discussion of the Due
Process clause. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1981).
148. “[S]uch guidelines have the not inconsiderable benefits of apprising the regu-
lated community of the agency’s intentions as well as informing the exercise of discre-
tion by agents and officers in the field.”  Community Nutrition Instit. v. Young, 818 F.2d
943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
149. See, e.g., Rules of Conduct Within Anarchy Online, at http://community.anarchy-
online.com/content/corporate/rulesofconduct.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2004) (“We
encourage role-playing in the game and on the role-playing conference, but remember
that role-playing is no excuse for harassment.  If you want to play an obnoxious role,
you have a great responsibility to avoid hurting other people’s feelings.  These social
guidelines take precedence over role-playing in a conflict.”). Compare Second Life Com-
munity Standards, at http://secondlife.com/corporate/community.php (last visited
Sept. 14, 2004) (“Linden Lab does not exercise editorial control over the content of
Second Life, and will make no specific efforts to review the textures, objects, sounds or
other content created within Second Life.”), with There.com Terms of Service: Behavior
Guidelines, at http://info.there.com/idx/32/183/article/Terms_of_Service_TOS_Be-
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D. Conclusion
This part has embedded the seemingly unbalanced power rela-
tionship between players and designers in three complementary
contexts.  First, it is an example of a general pattern in cyberspace
in which the game is only a piece in a larger, voluntary relationship.
Second, it resembles the relationship between sovereign nations
and foreign investors.  And third, it is similar to the power imbal-
ance between a government and one of its own citizens.  These
three analogies have different implications, but I think the com-
plexity of this portrait confirms that this relationship is worth fur-
ther study.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are two themes running throughout this article that I
would like to highlight.  First, there are questions of power:  Who
can do what to whom?  In various combinations, I have asked what
players and designers can do to, for, or with each other.  Second,
there are questions of meaning:  How do people understand the
significance of various features and behaviors in these virtual
worlds?
I believe that because of the virtuality of these worlds, these two
questions are intertwined.  Establishing the social understandings
that make a virtual society possible is both an act of laying out its
power relations and an act of agreeing upon its semiotics.  In its
own way, each of the four topics discussed illustrates one aspect of
the way in which these two questions relate to each other.  They
may even be the same question.
Of course, these questions are also familiar to real world law-
yers and scholars.  The answers to these questions become more
salient when they are analyzed in the context of online virtual
worlds.  It is my hope that from this reflection we may gain insight
into answering these questions in the virtual world we inhabit
offline.
havior_Guidelines.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004)  (“We will do our best to judge all
individuals and actions based on their own merits and in context.  We reserve the right
to moderate the activities in our community for any reason.”).
